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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Andres Alvarez appeals following the district court's revocation of his probation 
and the district court's denial of his motion for credit for time served. On appeal, 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it calculated his credit for time 
served. The 2015 amendments to the credit statutes, which are retroactive, require the 
district court to give Mr. Alvarez credit for all the time served as a condition of his 
probation. Mr. Alvarez also asserts that the district court erred in revoking his probation. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On April 13, 2013, Correctional Officer Kelly Hodge was picking up food trays in 
the segregation unit at the Idaho Correctional Center. (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSl), 1 p.3.) According to Officer Hodge, Mr. Alvarez threw his food 
tray out through the food port, hitting him in the knee. (PSI, p.3.) This did not cause 
any long term injuries. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Alvarez was charged with battery on a correctional officer. (R., p.42.) He 
was found guilty following a jury trial. (R., p.110.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of three years, with six months fixed, and the court suspended the sentence 
and placed Mr. Alvarez on probation. (R., p.137.) Mr. Alvarez appealed, asserting that 
the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive underlying sentence. 
(R., p.146.) In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
Mr. Alvarez's sentence. State v. Alvarez, 2015 Opinion No. 397 (Ct. App. March 6, 
2015) (unpublished). 
1 The designation "PSI" shall refer to the electronic file created in Idaho Supreme Court 
case number 41986, containing the PSI and all attachments. 
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Over eight months later, the State filed a report of probation violation which 
alleged that Mr. Alvarez violated his probation by failing to attend treatment, failing to 
report that he was fired from his job, twice failing to report to his probation officer, 
changing residence without permission, and failing to pay fines, fees or costs. (Supp. 
R., pp.9-18.) The State filed an amended report six months later which alleged that 
Mr. Alvarez also violated his probation by being charged with two counts of 
misdemeanor battery. (Supp. R., pp.21-40.) 
Mr. Alvarez admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his 
probation, and the district court revoked his probation. (Supp. R., pp.53-57.) The 
district court calculated Mr. Alvarez's credit for time served as 184 days. (Supp. 
R., pp.55-56.) Mr. Alvarez filed a timely notice of appeal. (Supp. R., pp.58-60.) 
On May 26, 2015, Mr. Alvarez filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served and 
supporting affidavit in which he asserted that he should have received credit for all of 
the time he served in conjunction with the charge and the resulting sentence imposed 
by the Court. (Supp. R., pp.63-67.) 
On July 2, 2015, the district court denied Mr. Alvarez's motion without a hearing. 
(Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, pp.1-5, attached to the Motion to 
Augment filed on October 26, 2015.) The district court found that Mr. Alvarez was 
ordered to serve 60 days as a condition of probation, but was not entitled to credit for 
this time. (Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, p.4, attached to the Motion 
to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.) However, the district court did adjust 
Mr. Alvarez's credit calculation for a total time credited of 226 days. (Order Denying 
Motion for Credit for Time Served, p.4, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
October 23, 2015.) The district court likewise adjusted the credit calculation to reflect 
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credit for 226 days in a corrected order revoking probation, filed on July 1, 2015. 
(Corrected Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and Commitment, attached 
to the Motion to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Alvarez credit for time he served as a 
condition of probation? 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alvarez Credit For Time He Served As A 
Condition Of Probation 
A Introduction 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it denied him credit for time 
he served as a condition of probation. Mr. Alvarez filed a pro se Motion for Credit for 
Time Served and supporting affidavit in which he asserted that he should have received 
credit for all of the time he served in conjunction with the charge and the resulting 
sentence imposed by the Court. (Supp. R., pp.63-67.) The district court denied the 
motion in part and granted the motion in part on July 2, 2015. (Order Denying Motion 
for Credit for Time Served, attached to Motion to Augment, p.1, filed October 23, 2015.) 
The district court acknowledged that the law governing credit for time served as a 
condition of probation had been amended and noted that Mr. Alvarez had served 60 
days as a condition of probation, but refused to credit Mr. Alvarez for the time. (Order 
Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served. attached to Motion to Augment, pp.3-4, filed 
October 23, 2015.) Although the district court also issued a corrected order revoking 
probation which gave Mr. Alvarez credit for 226 days served, the district court's award 
of credit specifically excepted from its re-calculation the days Mr. Alvarez served as a 
condition of probation. (Corrected Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and 
Commitment, p.3, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.) 
Mr. Alvarez respectfully requests that this Court vacate and remand this case with 
instructions that Mr. Alvarez be given credit for time served for the 60 days he served as 
a condition of probation. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court properly applied the law 
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, 
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record 
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id. An appellate court exercises free review over 
questions of law. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alvarez's Request For Credit For 
Time He Served As A Condition Of Probation 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes require the 
district court to give him credit for all the time served as a condition of probation, and the 
district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served and in refusing to 
award him credit for time spent on probation.2 The Amendments to the two relevant 
statutes took effect on July 1, 2015. Where the district court issued a corrected order 
revoking probation on July 1, 2015, and issued its order denying Mr. Alvarez's motion 
for credit for time served on July 2, 2015, the statutory language in effect at the time the 
district court calculated the time Mr. Alvarez had served required the district court to 
credit Mr. Alvarez with time served as a condition of probation. 
Idaho Code Sections 18-309 and 19-2603 govern, inter alia, credit for 
incarceration ordered as a condition of probation. 
As amended, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides: 
2 Because a motion requesting credit for time served may be brought "at any time" 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c), credit for time served can be calculated or re-calculated at any 
time. I.C.R. 35(c). 
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In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld 
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later 
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed 
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served 
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or 
suspended judgment. 
I.C. § 19-2603, as amended, similarly provides: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce 
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment 
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time 
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence 
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench 
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served 
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho 
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
The amendments to both of the credit statutes became effective on July 1, 2015. See 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H B. 64). Because the effective date of the 
amendments was on or before the date the district court's orders calculating credit for 
time served were filed, the district court erred in refusing to give Mr. Alvarez credit for 
time served as a condition of probation. 
1. The Plain Language Of The 2015 Amendments Requires The District 
Court To Calculate Credit Pursuant To The Amendments That Were 
Effective At The Time Credit Was Calculated 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that this Court should hold he is entitled to credit for all of the 
time spent in custody as a condition of probation. This matter is pending from a timely 
appeal from the order revoking his probation, and, during the pendency of his direct 
appeal, the district court filed documents calculating his credit for time served. At the 
time the district court entered its orders calculating Mr. Alvarez's credit for time served, 
the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes were in effect. 
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The plain language of the 2015 statutory amendments requires the district court 
to calculate credit pursuant to the amendments if they were effective at the time the 
court calculates time served. Specifically, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides, in relevant part: "in 
computing the term of imprisonment when ... sentence has been suspended and is 
later imposed, the person ... shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original . . . suspended 
judgment." I.C. § 18-309(2). Under the plain language of the amendment, the statute 
applies after the sentence which was suspended is later imposed. Similarly, I.C. § 19-
2603 now provides, in relevant part: "When the court finds that the defendant has 
violated the terms and conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The 
defendant shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a condition of 
probation under the ... suspended sentence." I.C. § 19-2603. Again, the contemplated 
time for the awarding of credit is after the district court revokes probation. Thus, the 
amendments clearly provide that they apply to calculations of time served made after 
the amendments were effective, and no further analysis regarding retroactivity is 
necessary. 
Because the effective date of the amendments was on or before the date the 
district court's orders calculating credit for time served were filed, the district court erred 
in refusing to give Mr. Alvarez credit for time served as a condition of probation. 
2. Alternatively, Should This Court Find That The Time Calculation Must Be 
Analyzed From The Dates Mr. Alvarez Actually Was Incarcerated As A 
Condition Of Probation, The 2015 Amendments To The Credit Statutes 
Apply Retroactively 
Should this Court require the time calculation occur during the period of time 
Mr. Alvarez was incarcerated as a term of his probation, Mr. Alvarez asserts that the 
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2015 amendments to the credit statutes are retroactive and require the district court to 
give him credit for all the time served as a condition of probation. 
The amendments to the credit statutes mandating that a defendant receive credit 
for time spent incarcerated as a condition of his probation became effective on July 1, 
2015. See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch 99 (H.B. 64). Should this Court find the 
relevant inquiry is whether the time for credit to be determined is when Mr. Alvarez 
actually served the time as a condition of probation, this Court must then determine 
whether the amendments are retroactive. The 2015 amendments are retroactive, th us 
Mr. Alvarez is entitled to credit for those days he spent incarcerated as a condition of his 
probation. 
The plain language of the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes expressly 
declares the intent for those amendments to be retroactive. Section 18-309(2) provides 
that a defendant "shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration 
served as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended judgment." 
Section 19-2603 similarly provides that a defendant "shall receive credit ... for any time 
served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or 
suspended sentence." 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation. "The interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of 
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more than one reasonable construction An unambiguous statute would have only one 
reasonable interpretation." Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) "We have 
consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 'The 
asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or 
void "an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce 
absurd results when construed as written." Id. at 896. "If the statute as written is 
socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." Id. at 
893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"In general, legislation acts prospectively." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 
937 (2014). However, there are some cases where a new piece of legislation or an 
amendment to an existing statute will be retroactive in effect. See, e.g., id. at 938 
(holding that an amendment to an existing statute had retroactive effect). As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has explained, '"a statute should be applied retroactively only if the 
legislature has clearly expressed that intent or such intent is clearly implied by the 
language of the statute."' Id. (quoting Kent v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 93 Idaho 618, 
621 (1970)); cf Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (holding that courts are to give effect to the 
plain language of the statute when the statute is unambiguous). 
For example, the Guzman Court explained, '"if the language clearly refers to the 
past as well as the future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly 
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declared within the meaning of [the statute].'" Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting 
Peavy v. Mccombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151 (1914)) (bracketed text amended). As such, an 
amendment to a statute which provided, "'[w]henever any . herd district ... has 
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created ... by an order,' '[n]o 
challenge to ... such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has 
lapsed from the date of the order,"' clearly expressed the legislative intent for that 
amendment to be retroactive in scope. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting I.C. § 31-
857) (ellipses from original). The reason was "[t]his language referencing 'any' order 
that 'has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be'" referred to both past and future events, 
thus making that portion of the statute retroactive. See id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that statutory language providing: 
"'[T]he administration of all rights to the use of ground water, whenever or however 
acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically excepted therefrom, be governed 
by the provisions of this act,"' made the statute retroactive in scope "by the express 
language in [that section] of the original act." A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of 
Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 508 (2012) (quoting 1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 200). As 
in Guzman, it was the inclusion of "ill! rights ... whenever or however acquired or to be 
acquired," thus referring to past and future events, which demonstrated the intent for the 
statute to be retroactive. See id. (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied this rule to statutory amendments 
which alter the consequences of a criminal conviction. See State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 
849, 851 (2012) (considering whether an amendment to the sex offender registration act 
was retroactive). In Forbes, the Court determined the statutory amendment had 
retroactive effect because "the Legislature, by implication, intended the amendment to 
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apply to offenders who have already been granted a withheld judgment." Id. (citing 
State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011)). Specifically, the amendment 
provided, in relevant part: '"A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense 
requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not 
be subject to dismissal or reduction under this section."' Id. (quoting 2006 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 157). As in Guzman and A & B Irrigation District, it was the language "for any 
offense" which expressly declared the intent for that amendment to be retroactive. 3 See 
id. (emphasis added); cf Tugade v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) 
(holding "[t]he statute, §241(a)(11) as amended, 70 Stat. 575 (1956), by its terms is 
specifically made retroactive to one 'who at any time has been convicted of ... any law 
... relating to the illicit possession of ... narcotic drugs .... "') (alterations in original) 
(emphasis added). 
Like the statutory amendment at issue in Forbes, as well as the statutes at issue 
in Guzman and A & B Irrigation District, the language of the 2015 amendments to the 
credit statutes expresses a clear intent for those amendments to be retroactive 
in scope: 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld 
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later 
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed 
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served 
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended 
judgment. 
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service 
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to 
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time 
3 That conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the Court had already determined this 
amendment did not violate the protections against ex post facto laws. See Forbes, 152 
Idaho at 851-52 (citing State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011 )). 
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served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, 
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (amending, respectively, LC. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603) 
(emphasis added). Just "[a]s the GWA[4] governs all water rights whenever acquired, 
[and] l.C. § 31-857 governs all herd district ordinances whenever enacted," the 
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 govern all periods of incarceration served 
as conditions of release on probation, whenever enforced. See Guzman, 155 Idaho at 
938; cf Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (holding the amendment to the sex offender 
registration act governs all judgments of conviction for sex offenses, whenever entered). 
Thus, by using the term "any," thereby referring to past and future periods of 
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation, the language of the 2015 
amendments to the credit statutes expressly declared that those amendments were 
retroactive in scope. 
Because the Legislature made the amendments to the credit statutes retroactive 
in scope, they control in Mr. Alvarez's case should this Court determine that the time for 
calculation is the time he actually was in custody as a condition of probation. Thus, the 
district court should have ordered that Mr. Alvarez receive credit for the 60 days he 
served as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not give Mr. Alvarez 
credit for all the time served as a condition of probation, it erred when it calculated his 
credit for time served. 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled 
to additional credit for time served for the time he was incarcerated as a condition of his 
4 The Ground Water Act, which was at issue in A & B Irr. Dist. 
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probation, the district court erred when it denied him credit. This Court should hold that 
Mr. Alvarez is entitled to credit for all of the time spent in custody in his case. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Alvarez's Probation 
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
his probation and executed his original sentence of three years, with one-half year fixed. 
He asserts that the violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the 
goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by 
his continued supervision under the probation department. 
There are generally two questions that must be answered by the district court in 
addressing allegations of probation violations: first, the court must determine whether 
the defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if 
a violation of probation has been found. the trial court must then decide the appropriate 
remedy for the violation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "The 
determination of whether a probation violation has been established is separate from 
the decision of what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation." Id. (quoting 
State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). Once a probation violation has been 
found, the district court must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant 
revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However, 
probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 
(Ct. App. 1989). The district court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal 
of rehabilitation and whether probation is consistent with the protection of society. 
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). If a knowing and intentional 
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probation violation has been proved, a district court's decision to revoke probation will 
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. I.C § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529. 
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, 
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,382 (Ct. App. 1994). 
As to the first issue before the district court, Mr. Alvarez concedes that he 
violated conditions of his probation as he admitted that he had done so. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3, 
L 16 - p.5, L 14.) However, Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in finding that his probation violations justified revocation. Mr. Alvarez asserts 
that his continued probation would achieve the goals of his rehabilitation and the 
protection of society. 
Although Mr. Alvarez's violations were serious, they did not justify revoking his 
probation. Mr. Alvarez admitted to violating the terms of his probation by failing to 
maintain full-time employment, failing to pay fines, fees, and costs, and failing to 
reimburse the county for the cost of the public defender. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3, L 16 - p.5, 
L 14.) However, Mr. Alvarez took accountability for his actions and admitted he violated 
his probation. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3, L.16- p.5, L.14.) 
Initially, Mr. Alvarez was doing well on probation-he was employed full-time, he 
was engaged in treatment and was making restitution payments. (Addendum to 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSl), 5 pp.17-18.) However, in June of 
2014, Mr. Alvarez became ill and he began having difficulty with his living situation 
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which resulted in his getting fired from his full-time employment. (APSI, pp.20-24.) 
After the probation violation was filed, Mr. Alvarez was charged with simple assault. 
(APSI, p.24.) Yet, Mr. Alvarez has turned a corner. He realizes he wants to be 
successful on probation by doing the work and remaining in the community. (3/25/15 
Tr., p.12, L.10-p.13, L.25.) 
In light of all of the evidence that was presented to the district court, it abused its 
discretion when revoked Mr. Alvarez's probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Alvarez respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for 
all time he was incarcerated on this case, including the time served as a condition of 
probation. Additionally, Mr. Alvarez asks this Court to place him back on probation. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2015. 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
5 The designation APSI shall refer to the additional confidential sentencing materials in 
the electronic file prepared for Idaho Supreme Court case number 43094. 
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